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ABSTRACT
When a false memory contains detailed information about an event that never occurred it
is called an illusory recollection. Previous experiments demonstrated that the contextual
characteristics of studied words are attributed to false memories of nonstudied theme
words. Additionally, contextual characteristics of the studied items that are most highly
associated to a theme word are more often attributed than those of lower associates. The
finding that the critical theme word takes on the contextual characteristics of its strongest
associates was aptly named the source-strength effect. In two experiments, the sourcestrength effect is extended to word location independent of encoding instructions and of
an inference strategy. The study sets the stage for future research asking how source
representations are encoded or retrieved for falsely-remembered items.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Sometimes we think we experienced an event that never actually happened. Many
conditions can lead someone to report a false memory, for example, repeatedly imagining
an event or being presented with additional post-event information. Sometimes false
memories can include memorial details, further convincing us that the event did occur.
When false memory is the result of associative semantic processing, remembering
specific details of the experience of the event is called illusory recollection (see Gallo,
2006, for a review).
Early false memory research focused on associative influences on false
remembering. At that time, it was realized that participants would intrude related ideas,
but researchers could not reliably predict what words would be intruded. In 1959, Deese
observed reliable, predictable extralist intrusions using single-trial free recall. Whereas
Deese demonstrated false memory effects on recall memory tests, Underwood showed
these effects on recognition tests (1965). Underwood had participants study long lists of
repeated associated words. In a recognition test, he found that the semantically-related
words were more likely to be falsely recognized than new unrelated items, emphasizing
the idea that the strength of the associative connections between studied words and their
associated lures influence false recognition.
The DRM Paradigm
The experimental method used by Deese in 1959 was later revived by two
experimenters, Henry L. Roediger, III and Kathleen B. McDermott (1995). Deese’s
original experiment used study lists consisting of the 12 strongest associates to a
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nonstudied stimulus word. Studied lists were based on free-association norms created by
giving participants lists of stimulus words (e.g., “sleep”) and instructing participants to
report the first word that came to mind in response to each stimulus word (e.g.,“bed”,
“pillow”, or “tired”; Russell & Jenkins, 1954). Deese reported that individuals often
falsely recalled the nonstudied stimulus word.
In 1995, Roediger and McDermott published multiple experiments replicating and
extending Deese’s findings. They found high levels of false recall and false recognition
of the nonstudied stimulus word (also referred to as the critical theme word) using
Deese’s original 12-word lists and 12 additional lists they constructed. Most importantly,
Roediger and McDermott reported that false memories of theme words could not be
differentiated from true memories of studied words based on confidence judgments. This
revised and revived experimental procedure, which takes advantage of associative
relationships among stimuli, is now referred to as the Deese-Roediger-McDermott, or
DRM, paradigm.
The direction and strength of the association between studied and critical theme
words influences the likelihood of false memory. Association strength can be categorized
in two ways: backward associative strength (BAS) and forward associative strength
(FAS). A studied word’s BAS corresponds to the probability that the critical theme word
is generated when the studied word is presented as the stimulus. For example, the
probability that the list word “bed” elicits the stimulus word “sleep” is .638 (Nelson,
McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998). Alternatively, a studied word’s FAS denotes the
probability that it is generated when the critical theme word is presented as the stimulus
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word. For example, the probability that the stimulus word “sleep” elicits the list word
“bed” is .092 (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998).
Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001) examined seven properties of
critical theme words or study list words that might predict false memory including the
type of association, BAS and FAS. The three critical theme word variables were the word
length (the number of letters in each critical theme word), raw frequency (the number of
times a critical theme word is found in print per million words), and concreteness ratings
(based on a scale of 1-7, and as obtained from the word association norms of Nelson,
McEvoy, and Schreiber, 1998). The four variables of list words were the FAS, BAS,
inter-item associative strength (connectivity between word pairs within lists), and
veridical recall (average probability of recall of the studied words). In their multiple
regression analysis, BAS of studied words was the strongest predictor of false recall
relative to the other variables (Roediger et al., 2001).
Illusory Recollection
Subjective judgments of false memories have indicated that false memory is often
accompanied by contextual details in the DRM paradigm, a phenomenon called illusory
recollection. The presence of contextual details has been demonstrated using the
“remember”/”know” procedure. Tulving developed the “remember”/“know” judgment
task as a means of distinguishing between two subjective states of remembering (1985).
Participants are asked to judge their memory as “remembered” when specific details
about the word’s prior occurrence can be recollected. They are asked to judge their
memory as “known” when specific details are not remembered, but the participant
believes the event occurred earlier. Roediger and McDermott found that participants
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made “remember” judgments for 53% of the falsely-recognized critical theme words
(Experiment 2, 1995), suggesting that critical theme words did not only evoke a feeling
of familiarity, but also were consciously recollected as having been experienced.
False recall or recognition of a critical theme word may include contextual details
that are consistent with the contextual details encoded with studied items, such as a voice
of presentation or visual details of presentation. Past experiments conducted to elicit
illusory recollection include presenting each DRM list using two alternating voices (e.g.,
Payne et al., 1996; Mather et al., 1997) and presenting each DRM list using alternating
visual and auditory sources (e.g., Gallo et al., 2001). In many of these experiments, it was
demonstrated that source judgments for falsely-remembered critical theme words often
matched the voice of the corresponding list (Mather et al., 1997) and often matched the
heard or seen condition of the corresponding list (Gallo et al., 2001). The important
finding in these studies was that the contextual details attributed to theme words may
have been retrieved from or encoded during the study of associated lists, and not from
non-associated lists.
The contextual details reported for illusory recollected items can come from
semantically similar items. That is, the overlap between the visual and semantic features
of a new item and previously studied items seem to influence illusory recollections. Lyle
and Johnson (2006) varied the location and color of studied words and pictures as well as
the visual and semantic similarity of studied and new items. They found that when
imagined objects were falsely remembered, participants tended to report that the objects
had appeared in the location in which a similarly shaped or conceptually related object
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had actually appeared. False memories imported location from memories of seen objects,
a process that Lyle and Johnson argue happens at retrieval (2006).
Lampinen, Meier, Arnal, and Leding (2005) questioned the origin of the source
details that are “remembered” for critical theme words. In this set of experiments,
participants were encouraged to say, out loud, everything they were thinking while they
studied eight DRM lists. At test, participants were shown words and asked to make oldnew and remember-know judgments while thinking out loud. Lampinen et al. found that
for more than one-third of false remember judgments participants had clearly borrowed
content from actually presented items and used that content to corroborate their false
memories (2005).
The Source-Strength Effect
To address the broad question of which variables influence the illusory
recollection of source information for falsely-remembered words, researchers
manipulated the relationship between source information for studied words and the
strongest predictor of false recall: BAS of studied words. Hicks and Starns (2006) used
two equally memorable sources for studied items, visual and auditory. Each of 10 DRM
lists was divided into two sub-lists, the strongest six associates and the weakest six
associates (i.e., BAS). For each list, one sub-list was presented visually and the other
aurally.
In their first experiment, Hicks and Starns (2006) found that when participants
attributed any source to a falsely-recognized critical theme word, they were more likely
to attribute the source in which the highest-BAS study items were presented. When the
auditory source was attributed to falsely-recognized critical theme words, it was more
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likely to have been the source of the high-BAS items (.56) than the low-BAS items (.39).
Likewise, when the visual source was attributed to falsely-recognized critical theme
words, the pattern was the same: when high-BAS items were presented visually, falselyrecognized critical theme words had a .31 probability of being attributed to that source.
When low-BAS items were presented visually, falsely-recognized critical theme words
had a .19 probability of being attributed to that source. The finding that the critical theme
word takes on the contextual characteristics of its strongest associates was aptly named
the source-strength effect.
The results obtained in Experiment 1 (Hicks & Starns, 2006) demonstrated the
source-strength effect when source information from different modalities was presented,
in a visual information source and an auditory information source. Previously, an
experiment by Hicks and Hancock (2002) had shown the same effect using videotaped
presentations of DRM sub-lists by male and female speakers. Hicks and Hancock found
that critical theme words were more often attributed to the source that presented the highBAS list items (.48 probability) than the low-BAS list items (.34 probability).
Previous demonstrations of the source-strength effect have utilized sources that
were highly discriminable, for example, when low- and high-BAS items were presented
in different modalities (e.g., heard versus seen; Experiment 1, Hicks & Starns, 2006). In
addition, the source-strength effect has been found when the source details were very
enriched. In the Hicks and Hancock (2002) studies visual, auditory, and social
information could be recalled to identify whether the female or male experimenter
presented an item. These conditions maximized the likelihood that individuals would be
able to recall the specific source of studied words. In these experiments, we tested
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whether the source-strength effect would be apparent when high- and low-BAS item
source was limited to a single modality: visual location source memory.
Encoding and Retrieval Explanations of Illusory Recollection
Although theories of false memory abound, it is not clear whether illusory
recollection in associative false memory is due to encoding or retrieval processes. If
illusory recollections are due to processing at encoding, possibly the illusory recollection
is created because of the binding of source characteristics of associated words to the
critical theme word when it is activated (Roediger et al., 2001).
According to the activation/source monitoring theory of false recall, critical theme
words from DRM lists are activated at encoding via their backward associations to
studied words. This is more likely to happen for the highest-BAS items. Contextual
details from studied words become bound to the activated theme word, and because
activation is more likely when high-BAS items are studied the high-BAS source
information is more likely to become bound to nonpresented critical theme words (Gallo
et al., 2001). In this view the source-strength effect is the result of when, during the study
phase, the critical theme word is activated and encoded enough to be indistinguishable
from studied items.
Another explanation for illusory recollection suggests that at retrieval when
critical theme words are falsely remembered the contextual details from studied words
are misremembered as part of the false memories. This explanation proposes that
experienced events (e.g., studied words) are stored as collections of both semantic and
contextual features. Global matching models of recognition memory assume that memory
retrieval is performed by matching the features of a test memory probe (an item presented
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during the recognition test period of an experiment) to the features of all memory traces
(traces from the study period of an experiment; e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984).
Activation is computed based on the overlap between the features of the test probe and
features of stored memory traces. If activation reaches a threshold level, the test item is
considered remembered.
In these models, an illusory recollection is the result of retrieving the memory
trace that most closely matches the memory probe and reporting the features associated
with that trace. Sometimes the studied item will not have source features encoded with it,
though. In this view, source information is more likely to be retrieved from a high-BAS
item than a low-BAS item because the high-BAS items share more features with the
critical theme word. However, if the source is not available from the studied items’
memory trace, the individual must make a guess about source – effectively reducing the
source-strength effect.
One way to distinguish between the idea that source information is bound to the
critical theme word at encoding and the idea that contextual details from studied words
are misremembered as part of memories of the critical theme word as the result of
retrieval processes is to examine how the source-strength effect is influenced by varying
the binding of source information to the studied item. According to the misbinding-atencoding account, an encoding manipulation that improves accurate memory for source
information should have a similar effect on the processing of both high- and low-BAS
studied items. When source information is increased, critical theme words may be less
likely to be falsely recognized (Gallo et al., 2001), but the misbinding of source to
activated critical theme words at encoding should be influenced by studying high- and
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low-BAS items similarly. According to the misbinding-at-encoding account, the sourcestrength effect should be unaffected by an encoding condition that affects source memory
for studied items. According to the global matching models, increasing the source
memory for studied items should increase the source-strength effect.
The Current Study
The goals of the current study were to: (1) extend the source-strength effect to
source information that was less easily distinguishable in memory (two locations), (2)
supplement a retrieval account of illusory recollection by manipulating encoding, and (3)
determine whether illusory recollection is based on mnemonic evidence. Of interest is
whether sources that are not as distinctive, like variation in locations, will lead to a
source-strength effect.
We predict that when critical theme words elicited by DRM lists are falsely
recognized, they will more often be attributed to the location in which the highest-BAS
list words were presented. If the source-strength effect is greater in the intentional
encoding condition than in the incidental encoding condition, illusory recollection may be
due to processes happening at retrieval. If the source-strength effect is not greater in the
intentional encoding condition than in the incidental encoding condition, illusory
recollection may be due to processes happening at encoding.
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Chapter 2
General Method
In the experiments reported here, we addressed the question of whether two
sources from the same modality (i.e., the visual modality) will result in the sourcestrength effect. Unlike previous experiments testing for the source-strength effect, our
experiments utilized word location on a computer screen as the source information (Hicks
& Hancock, 2002; Hicks & Starns, 2006). The major differences between Experiment 1
and Experiment 2 are outlined here. In the first experiment, the instructions regarding the
encoding of source information were manipulated between subjects, while in the second
experiment, encoding of source information was the same for all participants. Another
difference between the two experiments addressed the idea that participants might be
using a guessing strategy to infer a source for the critical theme word. Thus, Experiment
1 utilized three response options at test (seen earlier on the left, seen earlier on the right,
and new) and Experiment 2 utilized four response options at test (seen earlier on the left,
seen earlier on the right, seen earlier but do not remember what side, and new).
Participants
University of New Mexico undergraduate students agreed to participate in
exchange for course credit or extra credit in Psychology courses. Participants were
randomly assigned to the between-subjects condition upon arrival at the laboratory in the
Department of Psychology. Participants were tested individually and experimental
sessions lasted approximately 30 minutes.
Apparatus
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Presentation of stimuli and recording of responses were controlled by E-prime 1.1
computer software (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002) running on a Dell
Dimension computer with a 24-inch Sony Trinitron monitor. For the source test, the
program collected responses and reaction times.
Materials
Encoding stimuli. Twelve lists of 15 associatively-related words each were
chosen from the appendix of Roediger, Watson, McDermott, and Gallo (2001). Ten of
these were the lists used by Hicks and Starns (2006): bread, doctor, mountain, needle,
rough, slow, smell, sweet, trash, and window, and two were added to satisfy a
counterbalancing condition: city and king. The words in each list were arranged from
highest to lowest backward associative strength (BAS) to the critical theme word (see
Appendix). For each list, the six items with the highest BAS formed the high-BAS sublist and the six items with the lowest BAS formed the low-BAS sub-list. Across the 12
studied lists, the mean BAS value for all high-strength items was 0.406 and the mean
BAS value for all low-strength items was 0.014 (Roediger et al., 2001). For six of the
lists the high-BAS items were presented on the left side of the screen and the low-BAS
items were presented on the right. The reverse was true for the remaining six lists.
Four groups of lists were created to pseudorandomize study list order, sub-list
presentation order (high-BAS sub-list first or low-BAS sub-list first), and source order
(left side first or right side first). The 144 items were presented one at a time on a
computer screen in 24 point bold Courier New font in white text on a black background
to minimize eye strain. Words were centered vertically on the screen but sub-lists were
presented on either the left or right side horizontally (Figure 1).
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Practice and filler lists were constructed from the normed car list (Roediger et al.,
2001). During the instruction period, the practice list consisted of the six highest-BAS
words. The three highest-BAS words were shown on the left side of the screen followed
by the three remaining BAS words shown on the right side of the screen. To decrease the
primacy effect, a filler list of six of the lowest-BAS words from the car list was presented
before the experimental items. For all groups, this six-item filler list was presented on the
left side of the screen prior to the 144-item study list.
Source test. The recognition test was composed of 72 new and 48 old items. The
new items could be related to studied items or unrelated to studied items. New related
items were the three items from positions 7, 8, and 9 of the studied lists (that were not
studied) and the critical theme word from each studied list. New unrelated items were one
item from each of 12 non-studied lists, and the critical theme word from 12 non-studied
lists. In addition to these 72 lures on the source test, studied items from serial positions 2,
5, 11, and 14 were presented. Thus, item types at test were studied items, new unrelated
items, new related items, and critical theme words. All participants in all groups received
five filler items prior to the test list. The filler items were three new items and two items
from the practice study list. These five items served as practice for the test procedure and
were not included in analyses. The five filler items and then the 120 test items were
presented in the middle of the computer screen vertically and horizontally (Figure 1). The
test sequence of 120 test items was randomized anew for each participant.
Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor in a quiet room and were
instructed that they would be studying lists of words for a subsequent memory test.
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Participants read instructions as an experimenter observed and answered any questions.
After the practice list was presented, the experimenter answered any remaining questions
and expressly told participants to be as accurate as possible when they completed the
memory test, rather than as quick as possible.
The six filler items and the 144 studied items were presented at a 2-s rate. A 500ms blank screen separated one study trial from the next. When the study list was
complete, participants were given multiplication problems to solve for three minutes as a
distracter task. The source test instructions were then presented. In Experiment 1,
participants had three response options (Figure 1b), while in Experiment 2, participants
had four response options (Figure 1c). As in Hicks and Starns (2006), participants were
told to carefully consider their decisions because some of the new items on the test were
similar in meaning to studied items.
After completing the encoding portion, the delay task, and the source test,
participants completed an information sheet that asked about medications they were
taking, handedness, and primary language spoken.
Data Analysis
In item analyses, we counted as recognized any studied item given a source claim,
regardless of whether the source claim was correct. We first analyzed correct recognition
of studied items. To evaluate objective memorability differences between the source
alternatives, we compared differences in the proportion of recognized items from each
source. We then analyzed false recognition of new items.
In analyses of source attributions for studied items, we divided the number of
correct source attributions by the number of items correctly recognized in a given source.
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We chose to conditionalize because we are interested in the processes underlying source
attributions.
In analyses of source attributions for critical theme words and other new related
items, we divided source attributions by the number of items with corresponding highBAS sub-lists presented in a given source. The analyses of interest focused on source
attributions to critical theme words. We also analyzed the proportion of new related and
new unrelated items attributed to each source.
Hypothesis tests were performed with a Type I error probability of .05 to define
statistical significance.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 1
The purpose of the first experiment was to determine whether the source-strength
effect would differ when the amount of source information encoded with studied items
was manipulated. We attempted to manipulate the amount of source information encoded
with studied items by varying the encoding instructions to participants. To preview, this
manipulation was not successful.
In all of the previous work, individuals were not aware that their memory for the
source of the information was going to be tested. The natural processing tendency of the
individual in this situation, when studying lists of associated material for long-term
retention, is to focus on the semantic content and relationships between words rather than
on the source-specifying details. Poor binding of source information to studied items may
result.
Processes happening at encoding may influence memory for source information.
Although the encoding of source information has been described as “automatic” (Hasher
& Zacks, 1979), these descriptions were based on object location memory. When
participants are told that they will be tested on their memory for words, they often utilize
effortful processes and employ a memory strategy that they believe is best (e.g., imagery,
rehearsal, etc.) (Reisberg, 2009). Memory for words and individual word locations may
not differ whether participants are told to remember location or not. However, semantic
false memories may be given source attributions more often when attention is focused on
source information for words during encoding. And, we hypothesized that these source
attributions would more often based upon high-BAS source due to semantic relationships.
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To increase how much source information was bound to studied items,
participants were explicitly instructed to pay attention to contextual details during
encoding. Intentional encoding instructions have been shown to be ineffective in
improving memory for studied items in part because individuals do not process the items
more effectively under intentional instructions. Source memory may be affected
differently, though. Intentional source memory instructions direct individuals’ attention
to the source-specific information during study and thus might be effective for improving
source memory.
To manipulate source encoding, half of the participants were given incidental
source encoding instructions and the other half were given intentional source encoding
instructions. In the incidental source encoding condition, participants were told to
remember the words for a future memory test. In the intentional source encoding
condition, participants were told to remember the words and the locations of the words
for a future memory test.
Our conclusions were contingent upon finding different source memory in the
encoding conditions. If the source-strength effect is greater in the intentional encoding
condition, we postulated that it may be because source information is more likely to be
available from the studied memory traces and thus attributable to retrieval of high-BAS
studied item source information at test. However, our manipulation of encoding condition
did not succeed in producing a difference in source memory between groups.
Method
Participants. Seventy-one University of New Mexico undergraduate students
agreed to participate in exchange for course credit or extra credit in Psychology courses.
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Seven participants were excluded because they were not native English speakers. Three
participants were excluded due to prior knowledge of or experience with the DRM
paradigm. Two participants were excluded for taking medications affecting cognition.
Two participants were excluded for being outside the age range of 18-30 years. Three
participants were excluded for failure to follow instructions. Two participants were
excluded for low accuracy (less than the criterion of .40, which is two standard deviations
below the mean accuracy of .71). This left 52 participants (35 female, mean age = 20.02
years) whose data were included in the analyses, with equal groups of 26 in each
encoding condition.
Source test. Due to a programming error in the source test, only 105 random test
items were presented to 49 participants and all 120 test items were presented to three
participants. The proportions of different item types remained as planned: critical theme
words were .10 of trials, new unrelated items were .20 of trials, new related items were
.30 of trials, and studied items were .40 of trials. Participants were told to decide whether
each test item had been studied or not. If a word was new, participants pressed the B key
on the keyboard. If the word had been studied, participants were instructed to press the F
key if it had been studied on the left side of the screen or to press the J key if it had been
studied on the right side of the screen. Keys were marked with adhesive labels “N”, “L”,
and “R” for these response options (Figure 1b).
Procedure. The general procedures described in the previous section were
followed except for the following. Participants in the incidental encoding condition were
told that they would be tested on their memory accuracy for studied words. Participants
in the intentional encoding condition were told that they would be tested on their memory

17

accuracy both for the words and for the locations where the words were presented on the
screen during study.
The source test instructions requested participants to decide the source of each test
item by deciding whether the item had been studied on the left or right or whether the
item was new.
Design. The design was a 2 (encoding condition) x 2 (associative strength) x 2
(source) mixed factorial. Encoding condition was manipulated between subjects and the
latter two factors were manipulated within subjects. The dependent variable was
proportion of falsely-recognized critical theme words attributed to the source in which its
high associates were presented.
Results
Results concerning overall recognition will be presented first, followed by source
attributions. Trials with response latencies greater than 10,000 ms and less than 300 ms
(0.908% of all trials) were excluded from the analyses.
Correct recognition of studied items. Items given a left or right attribution were
counted as correct recognition responses, regardless of the accuracy of the source
judgment. The mean proportion of correctly recognized studied items was .709 (SE =
.020) across groups. A three-way mixed measures ANOVA with BAS (high versus low)
and studied location (left versus right) as within subjects variables and encoding
condition as a between subjects variable (incidental versus intentional) was conducted on
the mean item accuracies of the studied items. As can be seen in Figure 2, a significant
main effect of BAS revealed that participants remembered high-BAS studied items (M =
.702, SE = .021) better than on low-BAS items (M = .614, SE = .024), F(1,50) = 8.118, p
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< .01. Studied item accuracy for low-BAS and high-BAS items did not differ between the
incidental source encoding condition (M = .717, SE = .029) and the intentional source
encoding condition (M = .700, SE = .030), F(1,50) = 0.552 (Figure 2). Unexpectedly, the
main effect of studied location (left: M = .620, SE = .021; right: M = .696, SE = .025) was
significant, F(1,50) = 5.355, p < .05. Additionally, the interaction of BAS and location
showed the difference between correct recognition of high-BAS items studied on the left
(M = .645, SE = .032) and on the right (M = .759, SE = .027) was significantly greater
than the difference between correct recognition of low-BAS items studied on the left (M
= .596, SE = .029) and on the right (M = .633, SE = .034), F(1,50) = 2.163, p < .05. The
interactions of BAS and encoding condition (F(1,50) = 0.552) and location and encoding
condition (F(1,50) = 0.248) were not significant.
False alarms to new items. A two-way mixed measures ANOVA with item type
as the within subject variable (critical theme word, new related item, or new unrelated
item) and encoding condition as the between subjects variable (incidental versus
intentional) was conducted on the mean proportion of falsely-recognized items. False
recognition of new item types did not differ between encoding condition (incidental: M =
.388, SE = .030; intentional: M = .386, SE = .030), F(1,50) = 1.725 (Figure 2). As
expected, a significant main effect of item type was found, F(2,52) = 328.308, p < .001.
As can be seen in Figure 2, false recognition of theme words (M = .703, SE = .027) was
greater than false recognition of new related items (M = .308, SE = .024) which was
greater than false recognition of new unrelated items (M = .150, SE = .022).
Source attributions for studied items. Source memory accuracy was calculated
separately for high- and low-BAS items presented in the left and right locations. Source
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accuracy was determined by dividing the number of correct source claims by the total
number of recognized items from that source. Table 1 displays source memory accuracy
for studied items by encoding condition, BAS, and location.
A three-way mixed measures ANOVA with BAS (high versus low) and studied
location (left versus right) as within subjects variables and encoding condition (incidental
versus intentional) as a between subjects variable was conducted on the mean source
accuracies of the studied items. A significant main effect of BAS revealed that
participants’ source memory for high-BAS studied items (M = .544, SE = .022) was
better than source memory performance for low-BAS items (M = .393, SE = .018),
F(1,50) = 38.074, p < .001. The main effect of location (left: M = .449, SE = .020; right:
M = .488, SE = .020) was not significant, F(1,50) = 2.486. The interactions of BAS and
encoding condition (F(1,50) = 0.630), location and encoding condition (F(1,50) = 0.027),
and BAS and location (F(1,50) = 0.580) were not significant.
Source attributions for falsely-recognized items. Table 2 displays the
proportion of falsely-recognized critical theme words that were attributed to each study
location and corresponding BAS condition for each encoding condition. To evaluate
whether a source-strength effect was observed, the proportion of critical theme words that
were falsely recognized and attributed to high-BAS locations was calculated for each
encoding condition. Results are presented in Figure 3. Collapsing across encoding
conditions, the proportion was significantly greater than would be expected according to
chance (.50), t(51) = 4.778, p < .001 (high-BAS source attributions: M = .633, SE = .028).
This source-strength effect corresponds to a large effect as measured by Cohen’s r (.556,
Cohen, 1992). The proportion of falsely-recognized critical theme words attributed to the
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high-BAS location did not differ between the two encoding conditions according to an
independent samples t-test, t(50) = -0.155 (incidental: M = .629, SE = .042; intentional: M
= .638, SE = .037).
To examine whether a bias existed for one location attribution over the other for
critical theme words (as was observed for studied items), we conducted a two-way mixed
measures ANOVA with location attribution (left versus right) as a within subjects
variable and encoding condition as a between subjects variable (incidental versus
intentional) on the proportion of falsely-recognized critical theme words attributed to that
location when the high-BAS studied items were presented in it. There was a small
difference (approaching significance) in the tendency to attribute falsely-recognized
critical theme words to the high-BAS location when the high-BAS studied items were
presented on the left (M = .588, SE = .041) versus on the right (M = .668, SE = .035),
F(1,50) = 2.889, p = .095. Additionally, the interaction of location attribution and
encoding condition approached significance (F(1,50) = 3.838, p = .056): in the incidental
encoding condition, critical theme words were called “left” when corresponding highBAS items were on the left (M = .628, SE = .057) about as often as they were called
“right” when corresponding high-BAS items were on the right (M = .616, SE = .050), but
in the intentional encoding condition, critical theme words were called “left” when
corresponding high-BAS items were on the left (M = .549, SE = .057) less often than
when they were called “right” when corresponding high-BAS items were on the right (M
= .721, SE = .050).
Aside from critical theme words, the proportion of new related items that were
falsely recognized and attributed to high-BAS locations (M = .567, SE = .031) differed

21

significantly from chance as well, t(51) = 2.075, p < .05 (Figure 3). This difference
represents the source-strength effect and corresponds to a medium effect size, Cohen’s r
= .279 (Cohen, 1992).
To test for a difference between encoding conditions in the proportion of falselyrecognized new related items attributed to the high-BAS location, an independent
samples t-test was performed and a difference was not found (t(50) = -0.703; incidental:
M = .542, SE = .038; intentional: M = .586, SE = .049) (Figure 3). To examine whether
new related items showed a bias for one location attribution over the other in the
intentional encoding condition but not the incidental encoding condition, we conducted a
two-way mixed measures ANOVA with location attribution (left versus right) as the
within subjects variable and encoding condition (incidental versus intentional) as the
between subjects variable on the mean falsely-recognized new related items attributed to
the corresponding high-BAS location. A main effect of location was found: “right”
source attributions for items where corresponding high-BAS items were presented on the
right (M = .624, SE = .039) were greater than “left” source attributions for items where
corresponding high-BAS items were on the left (M = .517, SE = .043), F(1,47) = 4.396, p
< .05. The interaction of condition and location attributions was not significant (F(1,47) =
2.161).
False recognition of new unrelated items was minimal across both encoding
conditions: M = .150, SE = .022. The proportion of falsely-recognized new unrelated
items was submitted to an independent samples t-test, and no difference was found
between the incidental encoding condition (M = .175, SE = .035) and the intentional
encoding condition (M = .126, SE = .028), t(50) = 1.089.
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Discussion
Experiment 1 showed that when critical theme words were falsely recognized
participants were more likely to choose the source in which corresponding high-BAS
items were presented than would be expected if they were guessing. The resulting sourcestrength effect replicated the effect found in earlier studies (Hicks & Hancock, 2002;
Hicks & Starns, 2006).
One unique result of our first experiment was that the source-strength effect
carried over to new related items (Figure 3). In fact, the lack of a source-strength effect
for new related items was argued as a reason that “a simple semantic relationship to the
list theme does not cause the [source-strength] effect” and that “the critical item is
unique” (Hicks & Hancock, 2002). Our results show that a semantic relationship to the
list theme does, in fact, cause the source-strength effect.
Even in correct recognition of studied items, we found that participants
remembered high-BAS studied items better than low-BAS items (Figure 2). This finding
suggests that items that are highly associated to the theme word are encoded better than
items that are only weakly related to the theme word. This difference was similar in both
encoding conditions, and was the only bias in source memory for studied items across
conditions.
Our manipulation of encoding condition did not produce a difference in the
source-strength effect, nor did it produce a difference in correct attributions to studied
items. We hypothesized that an intentional source encoding condition would increase
how much source information was bound to studied items because attention to sourcespecific information during study, and that “extra” source information would be available
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from the studied memory traces during the recognition test. However, our manipulation
failed to produce a difference between groups.
Participants may have had an overall bias for the right location over the left. First,
in both encoding conditions, participants favored the right side when attributing a critical
theme word to a high-BAS location. Second, illusory recollections with high-BAS source
attributions to critical theme words occurred more often for the right and less often for
the left in the intentional encoding condition than in the incidental encoding condition.
Finally, illusory recollections with high-BAS source attributions for new related items
occurred more often for the right side across both conditions. Our explanation for these
trends is that participants tended to employ a guessing strategy more often in the
intentional encoding condition, and utilized the “right” source attribution more often as
the guessed source. One possibility for this bias could be that participants tended to use
their dominant hand to make their responses when they were unsure, and because 87% of
the participants were right-handed this led to more frequent right-sided guesses.
In this first experiment, then, we demonstrated a large source-strength effect using
item location information as the source. Previous demonstrations of the source-strength
effect utilized sources that were highly discriminable or very enriched; the sources used
here to demonstrate the effect are impoverished and do not maximize the likelihood that
individuals might recall the specific source of studied words.
One concern with this experiment is that participants were forced to attribute a
source to the critical theme words. Therefore, the source attributions participants made to
critical theme words might have been guesses rather than judgments based on the
retrieval of source-specific information. Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the

24

source-strength effect with location sources and to reduce the influence of the
participants’ bias (possibly towards the right side). To do this we decided to test whether
a source-strength effect would persist even with a “do not remember source” option at
test. If the source-strength effect persists, we may conclude the effect is not based on a
guessing strategy, and that source evidence for falsely-recognized items is available to
participants as they make informed decisions based on previously-encoded illusory
recollections.
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Chapter 4
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, it was not necessarily the case that the participants were making
source attributions to the high-BAS side because they had illusory recollections of source
information for them. Because participants could only choose “left” or “right” when
making a source decision for any item, it is possible that the source-strength effect seen in
Experiment 1 resulted from participants guessing a response.
We conducted Experiment 2 in order to determine whether the source-strength
effect would persist even when the option of “do not remember source” was available.
Such a finding would be consistent with a memory-based account of illusory recollection.
With a “do not remember source” response available, participants are likely use this
response when a source judgment cannot be based on mnemonic evidence, and are
probably less likely to engage in a guessing procedure. In this second experiment, then,
participants chose whether test items were presented earlier in one of two sources,
presented earlier but “do not remember source”, or not presented earlier. The sourcestrength effect persisted even with our addition of the additional response option at test.
In Experiment 1, the source-strength effect did not differ when participants were
told to remember source information versus when they were not told to remember source
information. In order to focus on the broader question of whether the source-strength
effect is observable for highly similar sources like locations (when source information
may not be retrieved at all), we decided to not include this variable in the design of
Experiment 2.
Method
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Participants. Seventy-eight University of New Mexico undergraduate students
who had not participated in Experiment 1 agreed to participate in exchange for course
credit or extra credit in Psychology courses. Seven participants were excluded because
they were not native English speakers. Ten participants were excluded due to prior
knowledge of or experience with the DRM paradigm. Two participants were excluded for
taking medications affecting cognition. Five participants were excluded for failure to
follow instructions. One participant was excluded for low accuracy (less than the
criterion of .43, which is two standard deviations below the mean accuracy of .73). This
left 53 participants (38 female, mean age = 19.64 years), whose data were included in the
analyses.
Source test. All 120 test items were presented to all participants. Participants
were told if they remembered a test item as having been studied to decide the source of
each item as studied on the left, studied on the right, or studied earlier but do not
remember source. If the item was not recognized from the study period, the participants
were instructed to indicate that the item was new. Adhesive labels “L”, “R”, “K”, and
“N” were affixed to the F, J, Y, and B keys, respectively, for these decisions (Figure 1c).
Procedure. The general procedures described in the General Method section were
followed. All participants were given incidental source encoding instructions from
Experiment 1; they were told that they would be tested on their memory accuracy for
studied words.
Design. The design was a 2 (associative strength) x 2 (source) mixed factorial.
Both factors were manipulated within subjects. The dependent variable was proportion of
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falsely-recognized critical theme words attributed to the same location as the studied high
associates.
Results
Results concerning overall recognition will be presented first, followed by source
attributions. Trials with response latencies greater than 10,000 ms and less than 300 ms
(1.09% of all trials) were excluded from analyses.
Correct recognition of studied items. Items given a left, right, or “do not
remember source” attribution were counted as correct recognition responses, regardless
of the accuracy of a source judgment. The mean proportion of studied items correctly
recognized was .728 (SE = .016). A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with BAS
(high versus low) and studied location (left versus right) as variables was conducted on
the mean item accuracies of the studied items. As can be seen in Figure 4, a significant
main effect of BAS revealed that participants performed better on high-BAS studied
items (M = .771, SE = .017) than on low-BAS items (M = .685, SE = .019), F(1,52) =
26.806, p < .001. The main effect of location (left: M = .721, SE = .016; right: M = .735,
SE = .020) was not significant, F(1,52) = 0.610. The interaction of BAS and location was
not significant (F(1,52) = 0.432).
False alarms to new items. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA with item
type (critical theme word, new related item, or new unrelated item) as the variable was
conducted on the mean proportion of falsely-recognized items. As expected, a significant
main effect of item type was found, F(2,51) = 132.332, p < .001. As can be seen in
Figure 4, false recognition of theme words (M = .684, SE = .028) was greater than false
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recognition of new related items (M = .375, SE = .030) which was greater than false
recognition of new unrelated items (M = .256, SE = .020).
Source attributions for studied items. Source memory accuracy was calculated
separately for high- and low-BAS items presented in the left and right locations. Source
accuracy was determined by dividing the number of correct source claims by the total
number of recognized items from that source (including “left”, right, and “do not
remember source” responses). Table 3 displays source memory accuracy for studied
items by BAS and location.
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with BAS (high versus low) and studied
location (left versus right) as variables was conducted on the mean source accuracies of
the studied items. A significant main effect of BAS revealed that participants’ source
memory for high-BAS studied items (M = .503, SE = .024) was better than source
memory performance on low-BAS items (M = .450, SE = .023), F(1,52) = 5.854, p < .05.
The main effect of location (left: M = .462, SE = .023; right: M = .493, SE = .024) was
not significant, F(1,52) = 0.977. The interaction of BAS and location approached
significance (F(1,52) = 3.788, p = .057) indicating the difference between the sources of
high-BAS items correctly identified was larger (left: M = .466, SE = .029; right: M =
.540, SE = .030) than the difference for low-BAS items (left: M = .461, SE = .029; right:
M = .440, SE = .030).
Source attributions for falsely-recognized items. Table 4 displays the
proportion of responses (e.g., “left”, “right”, “do not remember source”) for falselyrecognized critical theme words and corresponding BAS condition. However, to evaluate
whether a source-strength effect was observed for critical theme words or new related
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words, the number of falsely-recognized items of that type attributed to high-BAS
locations was divided by the number of falsely-recognized items of that type attributed to
either location. This proportion is presented in Figure 5. The proportion of critical theme
words that were falsely recognized, given a source attribution, and attributed to the highBAS location was significantly greater than would be expected according to chance, t(51)
= 4.032, p < .001 (high-BAS source attributions: M = .650, SE = .037). This sourcestrength effect corresponds to a large effect size, Cohen’s r = .488 (Cohen, 1992).
To examine whether a bias existed for one location attribution over the other for
critical theme words, we conducted a paired-samples t-test comparing the proportion of
falsely-recognized critical theme words attributed to the location in which the
corresponding high-Bas items were studied (left or right). There was no difference in the
tendency to attribute a high-BAS location when the corresponding list’s high associates
were presented on the left (M = .396, SE = .034) or on the right (M = .433, SE = .045),
t(50) = -0.762.
Aside from critical theme words, the proportion of new related items that were
falsely recognized and attributed to high-BAS locations did not differ significantly from
chance (t(49) = 0.805; high-BAS source attribution: M = .528, SE = .035). Thus, a
source-strength effect for new related items was not found (Figure 5).
To examine whether new related items showed a bias for one location attribution
over the other for new related items, we conducted a paired-samples t-test with location
attribution (left versus right) on the mean falsely-recognized new related items attributed
to the corresponding high-BAS location. The main effect of location was not significant
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(right attributions for corresponding high BAS right side: M = .105, SE = .013; left
attributions for corresponding high BAS left side: M = .117, SE = .017), t(52) = -0.772).
False recognition of new unrelated items was minimal: M = .256, SE = .020. The
proportion of falsely-recognized new unrelated items was submitted to a paired-samples
t-test, and no difference was found between left source attributions (M = .022, SE = .009)
and right source attributions (M = .024, SE = .009) (t(52) = -0.179).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 replicated those of Experiment 1. Even when
participants were allowed to indicate that no source information was recallable for a
falsely-recognized word, the source-strength effect was observed. We showed that the
source-strength effect is not due to a guessing strategy: even with the option of “do not
remember source” at test, participants more often attributed falsely-recognized critical
theme words to the source in which corresponding high-BAS items were presented.
Although the source-strength effect was not as large as what was found in Experiment 1,
it was still large by Cohen’s standards (.488, Cohen, 1992).
Participants demonstrated better item accuracy for high-BAS items than for lowBAS items. This finding suggests that items that are highly associated to the theme word
were encoded better than items that were only weakly related to the theme word, even
when a third option of “do not remember source” was available. Despite the “do not
remember source” response option, we found a small bias for the right side for high-BAS
items: the source of high-BAS items presented on the right side tended to be correctly
identified more often than high-BAS items presented on the left side. As in Experiment 1,
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we believe this bias is due to a majority (94%) of the participants being right-handed and
more often making right-side location attributions for studied items.
All participants in Experiment 2 viewed 120 test items (12 critical themes, 24 new
unrelated, 36 new related, and 48 studied items). Thus, any variance found in the 105item source test for Experiment 1 was removed. Since each critical theme word and all
new related items were presented to each participant, everyone had the same number of
instances from each list, and therefore saw the same number of studied and new related
items per theme list. This is an important aspect because we know processes are
happening during both encoding and retrieval in the phenomenon of illusory recollection
(Roediger, et. al., 2001) and individual items on the source test might affect which
memory traces are accessed.
The most important result from Experiment 2 is that we demonstrated that the
source-strength effect persists even when participants have the option to claim they do
not have memory of source information for an item. Thus, participants are not simply
using a guessing strategy when attributing sources to critical theme words, a finding that
is consistent with a memory-based model of illusory recollection and serves as another
piece of evidence for the misbinding-at-encoding account.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Concluding Discussion
Source memory refers to “a variety of characteristics that, collectively, specify the
conditions under which a memory is acquired (e.g., the spatial, temporal, and social
context of the event; the media and modalities through which it was perceived)”
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993, p. 3). It is believed that illusory recollection
involves an attribution process where details come from another source and are
misattributed to the false memory. This often occurs when misremembering the
experience of a related word in the DRM paradigm, where the critical theme word is
processed more fluently than new, unrelated words. It is this fluency, then, that causes
people to misattribute borrowed or imagined perceptual details from actual presentation
(Gallo, 2006).
Previous research using the DRM paradigm has shown that critical theme words
take on the contextual characteristics of their strongest associates (the source-strength
effect; Hicks & Hancock, 2002; Hicks & Starns, 2006). However, these researchers used
highly discriminable or enriched sources, maximizing the likelihood that participants
could recall the source of studied items due to distinctive encoding contexts for each list
or sub-list. Since recognition of DRM list words relies on semantic associations,
individuals are more likely to utilize a broad, semantically-based recognition criterion
than when distinctive perceptual information is available (see Arndt & Reder, 2003, for a
review). We argued that locations on the left and right side of the computer screen are
less discriminable sources than videotaped males versus females, text versus auditory
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presentation, or text versus pictorial information (Hicks & Hancock, 2002; Hicks &
Starns, 2006).
Our research demonstrates the source-strength effect for item location
information: when participants falsely-remembered critical theme words, they attributed
the locations of each theme word’s corresponding high-BAS sub-list significantly more
often than its low-BAS sub-list. This is an important finding because sometimes the lack
of a detailed memory for a nonstudied word provides participants with reasonable
evidence that the item was not presented at study (Strack & Bless, 1994). We believe our
participants had detailed memories of falsely-remembered critical theme words, and
because BAS is the best predictor of false memories (Roediger et al., 2001) the encoding
of these “memories” was based on semantic association processes that were greater while
studying corresponding high-BAS sub-lists.
The source-strength effects found in Experiment 1 (r = .556) and Experiment 2 (r
= .488) are comparable to previously-reported source-strength effects. In the previous
research, however, one-sample t-tests were not used to compare source attributions to
chance, thus we have reported source-strength effects as the proportion of attributions to
the high-BAS side in Table 5.
We found the same source-strength effect whether participants incidentally or
intentionally encoded source information (Experiment 1). Our intentional manipulation of
source encoding was not effective using location information as the source. Additionally,
this encoding manipulation did not have an effect on accurate source memory. Perhaps
this lack of effect was because location information is harder to discriminate.
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The source-strength effect persisted even when participants were given the option
to forego making any source attribution (Experiment 2). That is, even with a “do not
remember source” option, participants attributed the corresponding high-BAS source to
falsely-recognized critical theme words. This finding is consistent with a memory-based
account of illusory recollection because individuals did not use decision processes (i.e., a
guessing strategy) when making source attributions for critical theme test items. Our
results provide further evidence that perceptual features encountered at encoding can
become associated with critical theme word item representations, despite the fact that
these theme words are never visually perceived during study.
Theoretical Perspectives and Implications
A retrieval-based account of illusory recollection maintains that contextual details
from studied words are misremembered and attributed to associated critical theme words
at retrieval. In this account each studied item is encoded as a collection of both semantic
and contextual features. When a studied item is presented during a recognition test, a
matching process commences between the semantic and contextual features of the test
item and memories for studied items. If a threshold of a match (for both semantic and
contextual features) is sufficient, the item is recognized correctly for a studied item
(global matching models; e.g., Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984). When a critical theme word is
presented at test, this same matching process is initiated and a search for both semantic
and contextual features commences. Since critical theme words are semantically related
to studied list words, and high-BAS items are more related, a high-BAS studied item may
be retrieved. Thus, the critical theme word is falsely recognized and given the source
attribution from the mistakenly-retrieved study item.
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These studies did not provide direct support for either of these hypotheses.
However, our finding that the source-strength effect was large even when source memory
for studied items was poor suggests that illusory recollections containing these contextual
details are not the result of retrieving source information associated with a studied item,
but may instead be the result of processes at encoding.
A misbinding-at-encoding account of illusory recollection emphasizes that critical
theme words are activated and encoded while studying DRM lists. This is more likely to
happen while encoding high-BAS items (activation/source monitoring theory of false
recall; Gallo et al., 2001) and therefore high-BAS source information is misbound to the
“memory” of the nonpresented critical theme word. At retrieval, the illusory recollection
(in its entirety) is retrieved when the cue is presented at test. This hypothesis is
strengthened by the idea that features are imported or content is “borrowed” when two
events are similar (e.g., Lyle & Johnson, 2006; Lampinen et al., 2005). While studying
the DRM lists, our participants may have been erroneously binding location information
of high-BAS words to the theme word.
Future Directions
A motivation for conducting these experiments was to evaluate whether sources
that were more easily manipulated along a continuum, and thus less discriminable, would
demonstrate a source-strength effect. We are currently conducting research that
manipulates the location of studied items relative to the BAS of the studied items to
better understand the variables influencing illusory recollection of source information.
In this line of research we have been discussing two theories of semantic false
memories that attribute illusory recollection of source information to false encoding or
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recollection of source information associated with studied items. Semantic false memory
is thought to be due to the associations presented in word lists. Words may be mentally
related in one’s pre-existing mental lexicon, co-occur frequently in language, share the
same categorical membership, or be similar in concept (Gallo, 2006). This spreading
activation/association view rests on the assumption that part of memory is a network
organization in which associations at the word level are linked together so that accessing
one word causes an activation to spread to related words and/or concepts (e.g.,
McDermott & Watson, 2001; Roediger & McDermott, 2000; Nelson, Schreiber, &
McEvoy, 1992). In this view illusory recollection is the result of misbinding. A second
theory that links the memory for source information to the memory for studied items is
the feature overlap view, where experienced events (studied items) are encoded as
bundles of features and the overlap between features of the test word and studied items
creates a memory signal for true or false recognition (Arndt & Hirschman, 1998). Here,
illusory recollections are the result of retrieving the source information associated with a
studied item.
Another major theory of semantic false memories that we have not discussed to
this point claims that semantic false memories are distinct representations of the thematic
consistency of the studied list. In this view, semantic false memories are the result of
retrieving a gist representation (Brainerd, Wright, Reyna & Mojardin, 2001). This view
has relied on similar mechanisms to the association/monitoring and feature overlap views
to account for the illusory recollection of source though. However, the idea that a false
memory is the encoding of a summary (gist-based) representation for an event is similar
to the idea of a “prototype”: the extracting of an abstract representation (prototype) that
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captures the basic pattern across a list of associated items during learning (Posner &
Keele, 1968; 1970). Posner and Keele demonstrated that individuals could come to
recognize a pattern of dots presented in different locations as part of a category if the
training dot patterns were slight variations of the later tested prototype (1968). In essence,
individuals learn to recognize one set of locations as being the gist of the training set.
Our current studies will help determine if location information reported in illusory
recollections is due to borrowing location information from highly-associated list items
or the creation of a memory trace that includes location information based on a
prototypical representation of source. One way to explore this is to utilize more than two
locations and divide each DRM list into several BAS-based sub-lists. If a falselyrecognized critical theme word is attributed to a source in which high associates are
presented, the false memory may contain borrowed location information from high
associates. If it is attributed to a source in which no studied items were presented, but it is
a location near to the location in which high associates were presented, then the false
memory may contain averaged, or prototypical, source information.
Concluding Remarks
The research reported here demonstrates a source-strength effect is found even
with sources that are harder to discriminate. Although we cannot conclude anything about
theory from these data, we suggest that the large effect size for the source-strength effect
suggests that accurate memory for source information may not be required to observe the
effect. Alternately, source information that is contained in an illusory recollection may be
the result of accessing a memory representation in which source information is better
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encoded, for example, if it is the result of processing the similarity across the studied
episode (the gist encoding).
The outcome of this research contributes to the general question of how false
memories become rich in contextual detail. The premise that source information of highly
associated words is more often attributed to falsely-remembered words, and that location
information can be utilized to accomplish this effect, leads us towards an exciting and
new line of investigation.
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Appendix
The Twelve 15-Word Lists Used in this Experiment
We chose to use the same lists as Hicks and Starns to replicate their sourcestrength effect using location (2006). We added two additional lists for counterbalancing
purposes.
Critical Item

Bread

City

Doctor

Word
rye
loaf
butter
toast
dough
crust
flour
sandwich
jam
jelly
slice
milk
food
eat
wine
metropolis
town
New York
urban
suburb
county
Chicago
state
capital
country
streets
village
big
crowded
subway
physician
nurse
stethoscope
surgeon
patient
clinic
dentist
medicine
lawyer
health
sick
cure
hospital
office
ill

BAS
.791
.552
.364
.364
.310
.243
.142
.067
.054
.053
.048
.012
.000
.000
.000
.536
.529
.383
.358
.265
.195
.152
.117
.095
.068
.054
.020
.000
.000
.000
.804
.547
.520
.479
.365
.300
.214
.152
.149
.049
.031
.028
.027
.014
.000

FAS

Critical Item

.000
.051
.487
.000
.058
.000
.000
.026
.000
.019
.019
.000
.045
.026
.000
.000
.307
.066
.000
.010
.010
.000
.132
.000
.020
.046
.000
.025
.010
.000
.040
.379
.000
.040
.025
.000
.020
.066
.101
.020
.051
.010
.015
.010
.025

King

Mountain

Needle
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Word
throne
queen
crown
reign
monarch
royal
palace
prince
chess
leader
dictator
George
rule
England
subject
climber
hill
climb
molehill
peak
valley
summit
steep
ski
bike
goat
glacier
range
top
plain
thread
syringe
haystack
injection
pin
thimble
sewing
knitting
prick
sharp
thorn
point
cloth
hurt
eye

BAS
.759
.730
.471
.383
.317
.315
.159
.134
.092
.034
.023
.020
.014
.000
.000
.603
.428
.291
.256
.248
.195
.108
.061
.034
.033
.028
.020
.000
.000
.000
.758
.520
.418
.331
.289
.218
.181
.135
.108
.030
.028
.024
.000
.000
.000

FAS
.000
.772
.016
.000
.039
.016
.000
.016
.000
.000
.000
.000
.031
.000
.000
.031
.265
.092
.031
.020
.020
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.051
.041
.000
.424
.000
.030
.000
.212
.000
.224
.000
.012
.024
.000
.024
.000
.000
.000

Critical Item

Rough

Slow

Smell

Word
sandpaper
smooth
course
tough
rugged
jagged
bumpy
riders
uneven
boards
gravel
ground
ready
road
sand
fast
snail
turtle
sluggish
quick
molasses
lethargic
speed
delay
hesitant
cautious
traffic
stop
listless
wait
aroma
scent
whiff
stench
reek
sniff
perfume
fragrance
nose
rose
salts
breathe
hear
nostril
see

BAS
.429
.416
.291
.192
.174
.128
.150
.027
.019
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.598
.486
.372
.340
.272
.170
.142
.061
.059
.034
.027
.020
.000
.000
.000
.678
.625
.577
.562
.510
.442
.393
.389
.108
.034
.028
.000
.000
.000
.000

FAS

Critical Item

.041
.352
.014
.048
.014
.000
.028
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.527
.020
.115
.000
.000
.000
.000
.014
.000
.000
.000
.000
.034
.000
.000
.000
.029
.000
.000
.000
.043
.036
.000
.116
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

Sweet

Trash

Window
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Word
honey
bitter
sugar
sour
candy
tart
chocolate
nice
taste
cake
tooth
good
heart
pie
soda
garbage
rubbish
debris
dump
litter
landfill
junk
waste
sewage
pile
scraps
refuse
can
bag
sweep
pane
sill
shutter
curtain
door
ledge
glass
view
screen
shade
open
frame
breeze
house
sash

BAS
.451
.435
.433
.405
.336
.223
.101
.095
.071
.027
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.456
.397
.266
.218
.209
.186
.126
.067
.053
.049
.048
.017
.014
.000
.000
.833
.682
.480
.189
.156
.152
.144
.048
.027
.021
.014
.014
.000
.000
.000

FAS
.000
.020
.061
.372
.162
.000
.041
.095
.014
.000
.027
.014
.000
.000
.000
.526
.013
.000
.013
.000
.000
.013
.026
.000
.000
.000
.000
.212
.026
.000
.179
.128
.000
.038
.147
.013
.256
.026
.000
.058
.019
.013
.000
.000
.000

Table 1
Source Accuracy for Studied Items by Encoding Condition for Experiment 1
“Left”

“Right”

Condition

High-BAS

Low-BAS

High-BAS

Low-BAS

Incidental encoding

.514 (.042)

.392 (.032)

.597 (.036)

.378 (.040)

Intentional encoding

.516 (.042)

.375 (.032)

.550 (.036)

.427 (.040)

Note. Proportions are shown as means with standard errors in parentheses. Proportions
reflect the number of items from a given source with correct source claims (e.g., studied
on left and attributed to “left” side) divided by the number of items of a given source with
any studied source claim (e.g., studied on left and attributed to “left” or “right” side).

45

Table 2
Source Attributions for Critical Theme Words by Encoding Condition for Experiment 1
“Left”

“Right”

Condition

High-BAS
on left

Low-BAS
on left

High-BAS
on right

Low-BAS
on right

Incidental encoding

.419 (.046)

.263 (.034)

.459 (.043)

.245 (.042)

Intentional encoding

.376 (.046)

.202 (.034)

.526 (.043)

.326 (.042)

Note. Proportions are shown as means with standard errors in parentheses. Proportions
reflect the number of critical items given a source claim (e.g., “left” or “right”) divided
by the number of falsely-recognized critical theme words presented at test in which either
the high or low associates were presented in a given source at study.
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Table 3
Source Accuracy for Studied Items for Experiment 2
“Left”

Source accuracy

“Right”

High-BAS

Low-BAS

High-BAS

Low-BAS

.466 (.029)

.461 (.029)

.540 (.030)

.440 (.030)

Note. Proportions are shown as means with standard errors in parentheses. Proportions
reflect the number of items from a given source with correct source claims (e.g., studied
on left and attributed to “left” side) divided by the number of items of a given source with
any studied source claim (e.g., studied on left and attributed to “left” side, “right” side, or
called “do not remember source”).
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Table 4
Source Attributions for Critical Theme Words for Experiment 2

Source
attributions

“Left”

“Right”

“Do not remember
source”

High-BAS Low-BAS
on left
on left

High-BAS Low-BAS
on right
on right

High-BAS High-BAS
on left
on right

.403 (.033) .246 (.035)

.433 (.045) .268 (.036)

.329 (.044) .321 (.045)

Note. Proportions are shown as means with standard errors in parentheses. Proportions
reflect the number of critical items falsely recognized by response (e.g., “left”, “right”, or
“do not remember source”) divided by the number of falsely-recognized critical theme
words in which either the high or low associates were presented in a given source.
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Table 5
Source-Strength Effect Comparison Table

Research
Hicks & Hancock (2002)
Exp 1, Exp 2

Source types

False
Source-strength
memory
effect

Videotaped male versus
videotaped female

.800

.671

Hicks & Starns (2006);
Exp 1, Exp 3A(1), Exp 3B(1)*

Text versus auditory

.678

.637

Hicks & Starns (2006);
Exp 2

Text versus pictorial

.650

.638

Hicks & Starns (2006);
Exp 3A(2), Exp 3B(2)*

Anagram text versus
auditory

.695

.671

Browning Thesis (2009);
Exp 1, Exp 2*

Left versus right locations

.690

.626

Note. False memory proportions reflect the number of critical items falsely recognized
divided by the number of critical items presented at test. Source-strength effects reflect an
average of all of the source-strength effects reported for a source type combination
(Source types) across a number of studies (Research). For each study, the source-strength
effect represents the number of critical items falsely recognized and attributed to the
high-BAS source divided by the number of critical items falsely recognized given any
source attribution. Experiments that utilized a “do not remember source” option are
indicated by an asterisk (*).
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a.

b.
nap

sleep

doze

L

R
N

snore

c.
wake
sleep

time
peace
K
L

R
N

Figure 1. Schematic of the experimental procedure. At study, words from each six-item
high- or low-BAS sub-list were presented individually on an assigned side of the
computer screen followed by the corresponding DRM sub-list, presented on the opposite
side (a); order, BAS, and side of presentation were counterbalanced within and between
subjects. At test, old and new items were presented in the middle of the screen in a
random fashion. In Experiment 1, participants had three response options: left (L), right
(R), or new (N) (b). In Experiment 2, participants had four response options: left (L), right
(R), new (N), or “old but do not remember source” (K) (c).
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Incidental Source Encoding

Intentional Source Encoding
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Studied Items Studied Items
Words
Items
Items

Item Type

Figure 2. Mean correct and false recognition for each item type in Experiment 1. No
encoding condition differences were found in the proportion of recognition responses for
each item type. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Proportion Attributions to High-BAS Side

Incidental Source Encoding

Intentional Source Encoding

.90
.80
.70
.60

r = .556
r = .279

.50
.40
.30
.20
.10
.00
Falsely-Recognized Critical Theme
Words

Falsely-Recognized New Related
Items

New Item Type

Figure 3. Mean source attributions to high-BAS sides of corresponding lists for critical
theme words and new related items in Experiment 1. No encoding condition differences
were found in the proportion of attributions for each item type. Dashed lines represent
means collapsed across conditions. A source-strength effect was found for both item
types, indicated by braces and written as effect size r (Cohen, 1992). Error bars represent
standard errors.

52

.90

Proportion Recognized Responses

.80
.70
.60
.50
.40
.30
.20
.10
.00
High-BAS
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Figure 4. Mean correct and false recognition for each item type in Experiment 2. Error
bars represent standard errors.
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Proportion Attributions to High-BAS Side
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r = .488
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Words

Falsely-Recognized New Related
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New Item Type

Figure 5. Mean source attributions to high-BAS sides of corresponding lists for critical
theme words and new related items in Experiment 2. Proportions are calculated as the
number of source attributions to high-BAS side divided by number of source attributions
to any side. A source-strength effect was found for critical theme words, indicated by
braces and written as effect size r (Cohen, 1992). Error bars represent standard errors.
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